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Bond market development is high on the policy agenda in East Asia, as
demonstrated by the Asian Bond Fund, the Asian Bond Markets Initia-
tive, and a range of related policy initiatives.1 Building bond markets is de-
signed to free Asian economies from excessive dependence on bank inter-
mediation and foster the development of a more diversiﬁed and eﬃcient
ﬁnancial sector. One can think of the desired results as having both do-
mestic and international dimensions. Domestically, banks have the weak-
ness of being closely connected to business and political leaders, but also
the strength of long-standing relationships with borrowers, enabling them
to bridge information gaps that might otherwise impede lending and bor-
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1. The Asian Bond Fund (ABF) launched by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Paciﬁc
Central Banks (EMEAP) in June 2003 is designed to catalyze the growth of Asian bond mar-
kets by allocating a portion of the reserves of regional central banks to purchases of govern-
ment and quasi-government securities. The initial $1 billion of investments, known as ABF-1,
was devoted exclusively to Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issues of dollar-denominated
bonds. ABF-2 is twice as large and includes bonds denominated in regional currencies. It has
two components: a $1 billion central bank reserve pool to be overseen by professional man-
agers for local bond allocation, and a $1 billion index unit designed to list on eight stock
exchanges beginning with Hong Kong in 2005. The latter is designed to facilitate one-stop
entry for retail and institutional buyers as well as provide a benchmark structure for track-
ing pan-Asian performance. The Asian Bond Markets Initiative (AMBI), endorsed by
ASEAN 3 ﬁnance ministers at their meeting in Manila in August 2003, is designed to foster
an active and liquid secondary market in local-currency bonds and to develop the infrastruc-
ture needed for the growth of local bond markets, mainly through the activity of six working
groups and a focal group intended to coordinate their activities.rowing. Bond markets have the opposite strengths and weaknesses: trans-
actions are at arm’s length, often between anonymous buyers and sellers,
but access to the bond market as a source of ﬁnance is available only to the
largest, longest-established ﬁrms about whom the best information is avail-
able. Given the existence of long-standing relationships between banks and
their clients, the banking system is ideally placed to provide patient ﬁ-
nancing for investments subject to limited uncertainty but long gestation
periods. Bond markets, in contrast, are the channel through which credi-
tors lend to enterprises investing in rival technologies, not all of which will
pay oﬀ, even with suﬃcient time. Such are the arguments that a ﬁnancially
mature economy should have diversiﬁed sources of ﬁnance, including both
an eﬃcient banking system and a well-developed bond market.
The international dimension emphasizes that bond markets may have
advantages over banks as channels for capital ﬂows. Banks value liquidity,
given that some of their funds are raised by oﬀering demand deposits; it fol-
lows that bank loans are generally of shorter maturity than bond issues,
and the short maturity of foreign liabilities is a notorious problem for
countries borrowing abroad (Goldstein and Turner 2004). Banks being too
big to fail, market discipline may be weak when such institutions are on the
borrowing and/or lending side of the capital ﬂow. These qualms about
bank intermediation of capital ﬂows provided an important part of the im-
petus for the Asian Bond Fund and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative.
In a previous study (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2004), we
asked how Asia was doing along the domestic dimension—how Asia com-
pared to other regions and how individual Asian countries compared to
economies with broadly similar characteristics elsewhere in the world in
terms of the depth of domestic markets. Here we provide a complementary
analysis of the international aspect. We assess bond markets as a conduit
for capital ﬂows (more precisely, as a conduit for cumulated capital ﬂows,
that is, stocks). Using bilateral data we analyze the importance of a range
of factors determining nonresident holdings of a country’s bonds. By per-
mitting us to compare cross-country holdings in Asia with cross-country
holdings in other regions, as well as analyze the determinants of holdings
across regions, we can gauge the extent of bond market integration and
how it compares across regions and over time.2
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2. In principle, one could analyze the integration of bond markets on a number of other di-
mensions, for example the convergence of interest rates and spreads. Similarly, one would
measure bond market development not just in terms of market capital capitalization but also
liquidity (turnover), bid-ask spreads, and a number of other measures. Unfortunately, data on
these other dimensions are more limited and fragmentary and thus do not permit as extensive
an analysis as we undertake here (although data on stock market capitalization, utilized be-
low, can be thought of as providing at least an indirect indication of ﬁnancial market liquid-
ity). For further discussion, see our 2004 study, and for an analysis of liquidity and spreads
that expressly compares Asia with Latin America, see Eichengreen, Borensztein, and Panizza
(2006).The vehicle for this analysis (as some readers will have guessed given use
of the word “bilateral” in the preceding sentence) is the gravity model,
which provides a natural framework for analyzing trade in ﬁnancial assets
(as well as trade in goods). An advantage of this framework is that it is
straightforward to compare the results with previous gravity-model-based
studies of the determinants of cross-border capital ﬂows mediated by in-
ternational banks.3
The basic framework explains cross-country bond holdings well. The re-
sults point to the signiﬁcant regionalization of bond markets in the sense
that investors are most inclined to hold the bonds of other countries in
their same region. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is most extensive in
Europe. Compared to the base case where the investors and the issuing
country are in diﬀerent regions, Europeans hold signiﬁcantly larger bond-
market claims on one another. We would be alarmed and begin to question
our methodology if we did not ﬁnd this, since the single market, the euro,
and subsequent eﬀorts at regulatory harmonization provide powerful ex-
planations for this pattern. More striking is that cross holdings are also
greater within Asia than across regions when we control for the basic ar-
guments of the gravity model. Bond market integration in Asia may have
signiﬁcantly further to go before it reaches European levels or meets the ex-
pectations of regional oﬃcials, but our results suggest that there has al-
ready been some progress.4
A number of our results also caution that bond markets are not a
panacea for countries seeking to tame volatile capital ﬂows. They indicate
that bond-market transactions are heavily inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial condi-
tions in the investing country, in turn suggesting that emerging economies
utilizing bond markets to access foreign ﬁnance can suﬀer disruptions for
reasons largely beyond their control. This was a conclusion of the literature
analyzing early post-Brady Plan bond ﬂows to emerging markets (see
Calvo, Liederman, and Reinhart 1993); it is timely again today, when ques-
tions are being raised about whether ﬂows into local bond markets reﬂect
better fundamentals in emerging-market economies or simply the fact that
the advanced economies are awash with liquidity.5Our results also indicate
that bondholders are attracted to the securities of countries whose returns
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3. This literature is surveyed in section 9.2.
4. A contrasting case is Latin America, where we ﬁnd that bond market integration, so mea-
sured, is even less than is typical of pairs of countries located in diﬀerent parts of the world.
This result is fully explained, it turns out, by the weakness of institutions in Latin American
countries, which continues to discourage foreign investors in the region (as well as foreign in-
vestors outside) from holding their bonds—and is associated with ﬁnancial underdevelop-
ment generally. Thus, Eichengreen, Borensztein, and Panizza (2006) compare bond market
development in Asia and Latin America to show that Asian countries rank signiﬁcantly
higher in terms of cost and reliability of contract enforcement, compliance with international
account standards, etc.
5. Empirical evidence that both sets of factors are at work is in Buchanan (2005) and Boren-
sztein, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2006).co-vary positively with their own; this result would seem to support return-
chasing rather than diversiﬁcation motives for holding foreign bonds. This
evidence of limited diversiﬁcation again raises questions about the
prospective stability of the market.
Section 9.2 starts with a review of previous studies, after which we in-
troduce the data in section 9.3. Section 9.4 reports the basic results, while
section 9.5 examines their robustness. In section 9.6 we turn to the key is-
sue of how cross-holdings of bonds within Asia and globally are related to
the development of national ﬁnancial systems. This leads us in section 9.7
to the role of institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, and mu-
tual funds). Section 9.8 reiterates the main ﬁndings and draws out their
policy implications.
9.2 Review of Previous Studies
There are now a substantial number of theoretical and empirical studies
using the gravity model to analyze bilateral commodity trade. Why the size
and distance between importing and exporting countries should success-
fully explain patterns of merchandise trade is intuitive: country size is a
proxy for both the supply and demand for tradeable goods, while distance
between the trading partners is correlated with transport costs. More re-
cently there has developed a rapidly growing, if still largely unpublished,
literature using the gravity model to explain trade in assets.6In that context
the meaning of the distance variable is less straightforward.7 Physical
transport costs are negligible in this case; more likely is that distance to a
country is correlated with availability of information about its ﬁnancial in-
struments and the determinants of their performance (investors are likely
to know more about these things in neighboring countries, to which travel
is relatively cheap). This perspective suggests augmenting the traditional
distance measure with more direct proxies for ease of information ﬂows,
such as bilateral telephone traﬃc and imports and exports of newspapers
and periodicals.
There is some theoretical basis for these relationships. Martin and Rey
(2004) show that if markets for ﬁnancial assets are segmented, cross-border
asset trade entails transaction or information costs, and the supply of as-
sets is endogenous, then bilateral asset holdings are positively related to the
size of the markets, negatively related to the transaction or information
costs, and positively related to expected returns of the assets.8 Using a sim-
ilar theoretical model, Faraqee, Li and Yan (2004) also show that the grav-
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6. In contrast to the substantial literature on bank-intermediated ﬂows and the growing lit-
erature on equity ﬂows, studies of the bond market—our particular concern in this chapter—
utilizing this framework are relatively few and far between.
7. We return to this in the following.
8. This assumption is consistent with the views that ﬁnancial assets are imperfect substi-
tutes as they insure against diﬀerent risks.ity equation emerges naturally. While these models are developed for
equity investment, one can show that the results can be applied for risky
bond investments.
9.2.1 Studies Using Data on Bank Claims
From the early 1980s the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has
provided information on the international claims of BIS-reporting banks.
Banks reporting to the BIS tend to be larger and more internationally-
active than the typical commercial bank, a form of selectivity that should
be taken into account when interpreting the ﬁndings of studies utilizing
this source.9 This measure of international bank lending is organized by
the country of origin of the bank extending the claims (speciﬁcally, the
country in which the head oﬃce of the reporting bank is located).10 The
underlying information is drawn from supervisory and statistical returns
of the countries in which the banks are headquartered. Data are broken
down by the national destination of the loans.
To our knowledge the ﬁrst studies to use these data are by Claudia Buch.
Buch (2000a) uses BIS consolidated data for one year, 1999, and limits her
source countries to France, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and
the United States (while distinguishing 75 destination countries). The most
important determinant of the extent of cross-border lending is ﬁnancial
development in the destination country (as measured by the ratio of bank
credit to GDP). Curiously, the presence or absence of capital controls does
not appear to have a signiﬁcant impact on the extent of lending. In a
follow-up study, Buch (2000b) then uses BIS consolidated claims data for
the longer period 1983–99. In addition to the standard gravity variables,
she includes in her speciﬁcation the volume of bilateral trade (which enters
positively and signiﬁcantly, where lagged trade is used as an instrument for
current trade).11 She also considers a dummy for OECD membership as a
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9. A not unrelated fact is that country coverage has expanded over time. At most recent 
report banks and other lending institutions in some 30 jurisdictions contribute to the con-
struction of the BIS data.
10. This is in contrast to the BIS’s locational data (not published on the institution’s web
site), which distinguishes banks by location rather than nationality. Arguably, the consoli-
dated data are more relevant for studies of ﬁnancial integration insofar as they focus on both
the cross-border and within-destination-country lending activities of foreign-headquartered
banks.
11. Rose and Spiegel (2004) focus on the connection between trade and lending as well.
Their strongest ﬁnding is that an increase in trade is associated with an increase in bilateral
bank lending. They instrument trade with distance and therefore do not include distance as
an explanatory variable for lending. They also use a common language dummy and a regional
trade agreement dummy. An alternative approach is that of Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005),
who use 2001 BIS data. They estimate two simultaneous equations for trade in goods and
trade in assets (using transport costs—UPS shipping rates—as an instrument for trade in
goods and hence omitting it from the trade in assets equation). In addition, they compute the
correlation of the average gross return on equity in the two countries. Interestingly, they ﬁnd
the same thing we do when we consider bonds below: a higher correlation leads to more
claims (they refer to this as the “correlation puzzle”). Another study that reaches the same re-
sult is Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2005).measure of the diﬀerential eﬀects of the Basle Accord (which enters posi-
tively), the Grilli-Milesi-Ferretti capital controls measure (which has a
negative but quantitatively small impact on cross-border bank claims), the
share of the banking system that is government owned (which aﬀects cross
border lending negatively), and a measure of exchange rate volatility
(which has no discernible eﬀect on the volume of cross-border lending).
Kawai and Liu (2001) use BIS data for the period 1985–2000. They con-
sider ten OECD source countries and a sample of developing country des-
tinations. Unlike other studies, they do not pool the annual data for suc-
cessive years but consider a series of sixteen cross sections. Like Buch, they
ﬁnd that trade ﬂows encourage cross-border banking lending. In addition,
the volume of bank-related inﬂows declines with measures of consumption
and rises with the credit rating of the recipient country (especially after
1996, suggesting a growing sensitivity to credit-quality-related considera-
tions). Countries receiving more bilateral foreign aid also receive more
bank loans from the same source. In contrast to Buch’s earlier conclusion,
the authors ﬁnd that a more volatile exchange rate discourages bank lend-
ing (this coeﬃcient is consistently negative, though not always signiﬁcant).
The interest diﬀerential between the source and destination country has no
consistent eﬀect.
Jeanneau and Micu (2002) study lending ﬂows from OECD countries to
ten emerging markets. Their principal ﬁndings include that aggregate ﬂows
are procyclical with respect to growth in the lending countries. They ﬁnd a
positive correlation between ﬁxed exchange rates and bank lending (rein-
forcing the earlier ﬁnding of Kawai and Liu). Ferrucci (2004) studies BIS-
reporting banks’ lending to nineteen emerging markets, and distinguishes
six advanced lending countries. The results support the signiﬁcance of
business cycles in the borrowing country (but not in the lending country,
which is contrary to Jeanneau and Micu), bilateral exchange rate variabil-
ity (which reduces lending), the overall level of indebtedness of the bor-
rower (which again reduces lending), bilateral trade (which enters posi-
tively), global equity returns (which enter negatively), and the yield spread
between low- and high-rated U.S. corporate bonds as a measure of risk tol-
erance (which enters negatively).
The most recent wave of studies (Eichengreen and Park 2005; Kim, Lee,
and Shin 2005) focuses on comparisons between Asia and Europe. To shed
more light on intra-Asian ﬂows, Eichengreen and Park (2005) supplement
the BIS data with unpublished data for Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Korea.12 Banks are distinguished by nationality rather than location.
They ﬁnd that cross-border bank claims are smaller in Asia than in Europe.
The standard gravity variables explain some, but by no means all, of this
diﬀerence. The remainder is explained by policy variables: more intrare-
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12. Obtained from the national authorities in each country.gional trade in Europe makes for more ﬁnancial ﬂows, past capital controls
inﬂuence current claims, and less developed ﬁnancial markets (as mea-
sured by bank credit as a share of GDP) make for fewer ﬂows. Kim, Lee,
and Shin (2005) augment the BIS data base with data for Korea. Unlike
Eichengreen and Park, they report results suggesting there is no remaining
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the volume of intra-European and intra-
East Asian ﬂows once one controls for the standard gravity models. This
may however reﬂect their limited geographical coverage for Asia.
The most comprehensive study in this vein is Papaioannou (2005), who
uses BIS locational banking data from the mid-1980s through 2002. Stan-
dard gravity variables perform as expected, but there is also a role for 
political risk ratings, in that recent declines in country risk in developing
countries have led to a signiﬁcant increase in cross-border bank claims,
other things equal. Papaioannou then tries to unbundle this variable by
substituting bureaucratic quality (which discourages foreign bank invest-
ment), time required to complete a legal case (which has a signiﬁcant neg-
ative eﬀect on cross-border bank claims), and government ownership of
the banking system (which has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect). When political
risk is reintroduced, it matters as well; “politics and institutions are both
key determinants of international capital transactions” (p. 5). Papaioan-
nou also considers the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ de facto classiﬁcation of exchange
rate regimes and ﬁnds that foreign banks prefer investing in countries with
more stable exchange rates.
Finally, Liu (2005) uses BIS data to test for the signiﬁcance of General
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) commitments—which are
highly signiﬁcant in his speciﬁcation. In contrast to other studies, he ﬁnds
no eﬀect of exchange rate volatility or the presence of capital controls.
9.2.2 Studies Using Data on Equity Markets
An early contribution to the literature on international equity transac-
tions is Ghosh and Wolf (2000), who consider ﬂows from Germany, Italy,
the United Kingdom, and the United States to nine recipient countries.
They include only the basic gravity variables, ﬁnding that most of these
perform reasonably well. Portes and Rey (2005), in a more comprehensive
eﬀort, consider bilateral equity purchases and sales between fourteen
source and destination countries in the period 1989–1996.13They compare
the performance of two measures of information costs: distance and tele-
phone traﬃc. The number of bank branches in country i of banks head-
quartered in country j consistently matters, as if banks and equity-market
ﬂows are complements rather than substitutes. They use market capital-
ization in the source and destination countries as a measure of market size.
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13. The data are from Cross-Border Capital. Their Asian countries include Japan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore.Interestingly (and in contrast to our results for bonds below), destination
country returns do not appear to matter.
Izquierdo, Morriset, and Olarreaga (2003) use the same data as Portes
and Rey (2005) for a similar period (1990–1996). They again use bilateral
telephone traﬃc as a measure of information ﬂows but also consider bilat-
eral trade in newspapers and periodicals; by distinguishing imports and
exports of newspapers they can say something about the direction of the
information ﬂow. Their most important ﬁnding, which is somewhat coun-
terintuitive, is that information ﬂowing from the source to the destination
country matters most for bilateral equity ﬂows (newspaper exports from
the United States to Argentina matter more than newspaper exports from
Brazil to the United States in explaining U.S. purchases of Brazilian equi-
ties). They interpret this as an indication of the importance of information
about the liquidity of the U.S. market.14
9.2.3 Studies Using Data on Bonds
Studies concerned with bond markets, our focus in this chapter, are few
and far between. Ghosh and Wolf (2000), in the same study noted in sec-
tion 9.2.2, estimate the impact of the basic gravity variables on debt out-
ﬂows from Germany, the United States, and Italy to a number of diﬀerent
destinations. Interestingly, these estimates do not appear to ﬁt the data
particularly well, except in the case of the United States. Buch (2000b) uses
IMF data on debt securities for 1997 only. In her study the basic gravity
variables are well behaved and look similar to those in regressions for bank
claims.15 The impact of having a larger domestic banking system is am-
biguous, with the sign of the eﬀect varying by source country. Finally, co-
eﬃcients on the ratio of bank loans to total debt ﬁnance suggest the rela-
tive importance of bond ﬁnance rises with the ﬁnancial development of the
host country, while country (population) size is otherwise insigniﬁcant,
suggesting minimal economies of scale.16
Thus, the few previous studies that have utilized the gravity model to study
the bond market raise as many questions as they answer. In what follows we
therefore see whether we can push this literature forward another step.
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14. In addition they attempt to identify the relationship between trade ﬂows and ﬁnancial
ﬂows, using import and export taxes as instruments in the commodity trade equation and
stock market capitalization as an instrument in the equities trade equation; the two relation-
ships are estimated simultaneously.
15. Suggesting in turn that the relatively poor results in the study by Ghosh and Wolf reﬂect
the very limited nature of their sample.
16. In the study otherwise closest to our own, Kim, Lee, and Shin (2005) use IMF data on
total portfolio claims (portfolio equity, debt securities, and bank claims) rather than just bonds
for 1997 and 2001 through 2004. They ﬁnd trade is positively associated with ﬁnancial inte-
gration. When trade is added, the dummy variable indicating that both the source and recipi-
ent country are in East Asia goes to zero. They also include a variable for whether one of the
pair is a global ﬁnancial center and ﬁnd that this matters strongly for Asia, as if countries in
the region are more heavily linked with global ﬁnancial centers than with one another.9.3 Data and Speciﬁcation
The dependent variable in our analysis is the log of bilateral interna-
tional portfolio holdings of long-term debt securities from the Coordi-
nated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) compiled by the IMF for the
years 2001–2003.17 The purpose of the survey is to collect information on
the stock of cross-border holdings of equities, long-term debt securities,
and short-term debt securities, all valued at market prices and broken
down by the economy of residence of the issuer. Central bank reserve hold-
ings are excluded.18
To date, the IMF has released ﬁve waves of CPIS data.19 The ﬁrst wave
was for end-1997; twenty-nine economies participated. The second
through fourth waves were released annually from end-2001 through end-
2003. The number of countries participating tended to rise over time; sixty-
nine economies participated in 2003. For each participating economy, the
survey reports holdings in all destination economies. The list of reporting
economies appears in Appendix A. For this study we create an unbalanced
panel using data for 2001–2003.20
In designing this survey the IMF has attempted to ensure comprehen-
siveness and consistency across countries. All national surveys are con-
ducted simultaneously, use consistent deﬁnitions, and are structured to en-
courage the use of best practices in data collection. Speciﬁc procedures are
recommended to minimize the danger of misclassiﬁcation and double
counting. For example, the issuance of depository receipts creates the po-
tential for double counting since there will then exist two securities that can
be reported as held, but only one underlying liability.21Depository receipts
are therefore recorded by looking through the ﬁnancial institution that 
issues the receipts; instead the holder of the receipts is taken to have a 
claim on the underlying asset. In this case American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) are recorded as liabilities of the non-U.S. enterprise whose securi-
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17. To avoid the problem of log of zero, we use natural logs of (1   the variable). The data
set and data description are available on the internet at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sta/pi/cpis.htm.
18. Thus, our results concerning the determinants of such positions should be understood
as reﬂecting the investment decisions of private agents and, where appropriate, government
agencies with foreign holdings. Although central bank reserves are excluded from the CPIS
data, it still could be that large reserves are a signal that exchange rates will be relatively stable,
capital markets will remain open, and liquidity will be ensured through backstopping opera-
tions. In the section on sensitivity analysis below, we therefore add reserves in both the send-
ing and receiving countries to our baseline speciﬁcation.
19. Since the ﬁrst draft of this paper was written, the ﬁfth wave of CPIS data has been re-
leased, but the amount of information made publicly available, especially at the disaggregated
level, is still limited. We prefer to wait for the complete data set before extending our analysis.
20. We drop the 1997 data since the smaller and less representative sample would likely ag-
gravate problems of selectivity (addressed in the following).
21. Depository receipts are securities that represent ownership of securities held by a de-
pository.ties underlie the ADR issue, and not of the U.S. ﬁnancial institution that
issues the ADRs.
Despite all this, there are problems with the CPIS (see also Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti 2004). These include (a) incomplete country coverage, as
some large holders of portfolio assets, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates, have not participated in the survey; (b) under-
reporting of assets by CPIS participants due to incomplete institutional
coverage; (c) third party holding, as the survey responses in some countries
may be based on custodians instead of end-investors; and (d) problems
with collection methods, especially for those participating in the survey for
the ﬁrst time. The exclusion of China may be consequential for compar-
isons of Asia with other regions, although we would note that ﬂows from
other Asian countries responding to the survey to China are included in
our analysis.22 Note that we are unable to analyze separately the determi-
nants of cross-border holdings of corporate bonds and government bonds,
since the CPIS reports only data on the sum of the two.23 Nor do we have
information on the currency composition of bilateral holdings.
The years 2001 to 2003, spanned by our survey data, were special ones
in international ﬁnancial markets. The beginning of this period was dis-
turbed by default in Argentina and ﬁnancial diﬃculties in Turkey, while its
end was dominated by low global interest rates and surging cross-border
investment.24 It is not clear in what direction these particular conditions
might inﬂuence our estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest. Still, it will
clearly be important to include year ﬁxed eﬀects or to apply equivalent
treatments to prevent our results from being contaminated by temporal
eﬀects.
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide summary statistics of the CPIS data by region
of source and destination countries. Table 9.3 provides analogous informa-
tion broken down by the sector of the holder. Table 9.1 shows the average
amount of cross-border bond holdings. It is not surprising that the cross-
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22. Also, since central bank holdings of foreign bonds are not included in the aggregates
analyzed here, as noted previously, the fact that China is not included is somewhat less trou-
bling. In addition to China, some readers may also be concerned about the results because of
the exclusion of India from the sample. According to the IMF’s International Investment Po-
sition Statistics, India invested $300–400 million in foreign portfolio debt securities during
the sample period. The exclusion of bond investment from India should aﬀect the results only
marginally.
23. Doing otherwise would violate the IMF’s commitment to keep conﬁdential the infor-
mation it obtains on the composition of individual central banks’ foreign reserves. Other ev-
idence (such as that reported in Eichengreen, Borensztein, and Panizza 2006) suggests that
the cross-border holdings analyzed here predominantly take the form of government bonds.
We are, however, able to analyze the determinants of domestic market capitalization (as op-
posed to regional and global bond market integration, our focus here) separately for corpo-
rate and government bonds in our companion paper.
24. Note, however, that 2005 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2006, when emerging market spreads
fell to unprecedentedly low levels and enormous volumes of capital ﬂowed into emerging
markets as a corollary of the so-called carry trade, are not included in our sample period.border holdings of long-term debt securities are the highest within the Eu-
ropean Union, as the region’s ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial develop-
ment are well advanced. While Asian countries hold a large sum of foreign
bonds issued by countries outside the region, their holdings of bonds issued
by countries within the region are relatively small. Latin America, on the
other hand, holds small positions in foreign debt securities, and the intrare-
gional holdings are smaller than those of Asia. Table 9.2 shows cross-border
bond investment in percent of the total bonds outstanding of the destina-
tion region.25 In other words, the table shows the share of each region’s out-
standing debt securities held by foreign investors, as reported by the CPIS.26
Our empirical strategy is to estimate the gravity model, augmented by
various control variables. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following equation:
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25. The total bonds outstanding are the sum of domestic and international debt securities
from BIS securities debt statistics.
26. The share of intraregional bond holdings in Asia appears to be smaller than in Latin
America because of the larger amount of bonds outstanding.
Table 9.1 Average cross-border portfolio holdings of long-term debt, 2001–2003
Investments U.S. &  Eastern Latin
From/To Canada Asia EU15 Europe America Others Total
U.S. & Canada 12,299 51,524 326,252 6,313 65,230 250,916 712,535
Asia 444,215 41,920 527,525 3,124 10,771 254,125 1,281,679
EU15 624,247 86,538 2,914,030 46,689 51,621 404,261 4,127,386
Eastern Europe 2,140 9 6,669 1,033 46 1,028 10,926
Latin America 15,193 78 2,225 22 6,999 1,161 25,678
Others 260,587 19,503 324,228 3,090 14,189 76,259 697,856
Total 1,358,682 199,573 4,100,929 60,271 148,856 987,749 6,856,060
Sources: IMF; Authors’ calculation.
Note: Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars.
Table 9.2 Average cross-border portfolio holdings of long-term debt as percentages
of destination countries’ total outstanding debt securities
Investment U.S. &  Eastern Latin
From/To Canada Asia EU15 Europe America Others
U.S. & Canada 0.06 0.64 2.60 2.05 7.97 9.65
Asia 2.34 0.52 4.20 1.02 1.32 9.77
EU15 3.29 1.07 23.18 15.20 6.31 15.54
Eastern Europe 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.34 0.01 0.04
Latin America 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.86 0.04
Others 1.38 0.24 2.58 1.01 1.73 2.93
Total 7.17 2.48 32.62 19.62 18.20 37.98
Sources: IMF; BIS; Authors’ calculation.Table 9.3 Average cross-border portfolio holdings of long-term debt, by sector of holders,
2001–2003
Investment to
U.S. &  Eastern  Latin
Investment from Canada Asia EU15 Europe America Others Total
Asia
Banks 129,438.7 5,689.3 122,740.3 174.7 632.3 88,296.3 346,971.7
Insurance 
companies 79,301.7 1,228.7 62,933.7 12.3 629.3 35,074.7 179,180.3
Mutual funds 20,187.7 297.7 20,691.7 178.3 1,110.0 6,402.7 48,868.0
Nonﬁnancial 
corporations 29,971.7 2,384.0 72,740.3 1,259.3 4,122.0 34,666.3 145,143.7
EU15
Banks 160,959.0 51,952.7 792,584.7 19,756.3 17,033.7 168,458.7 1,210,745.0
Insurance 
companies 105,456.3 6,570.7 373,012.0 1,476.7 902.3 43,001.3 530,419.3
Mutual funds 40,387.3 4,105.7 211,480.0 1,538.0 4,121.7 21,861.0 283,493.7
Nonﬁnancial 
corporations 29,592.0 981.3 103,420.7 2,243.3 13,031.0 31,213.7 180,482.0
Eastern Europe
Banks 293.3 5.7 750.3 50.7 25.7 58.3 1,184.0
Insurance 
companies 0.7 — 4.7 — — 2.7 8.0
Mutual funds 3.3 — 5.7 1.3 — 1.7 12.0
Nonﬁnancial
corporations 64.3 1.3 86.0 — 15.3 18.7 185.7
Latin America
Banks 4,596.3 53.0 996.7 5.0 4,659.0 812.3 11,122.3
Insurance 
companies 689.7 18.3 277.7 8.7 131.0 51.7 1,177.0
Mutual funds 131.3 0.7 17.7 3.0 218.0 8.0 378.7
Nonﬁnancial
corporations. 3,568.7 0.3 114.0 — 739.3 67.0 4,489.3
Others 
Banks 19,519.0 851.0 29,469.7 592.0 550.0 6,583.0 57,564.7
Insurance 
companies 37,889.7 679.0 22,482.7 33.7 196.3 2,512.0 63,793.3
Mutual funds 15,836.7 1,439.0 13,357.3 142.3 886.0 3,216.0 34,877.3
Nonﬁnancial 
corporations 820.0 11.3 1,634.3 15.0 24.0 230.3 2,735.0
Source: IMF; Authors’ calculation.
Note: Figures in millions of U.S. dollars.ln(bondijt)      1 ln(Sizeit)    2 ln(Sizejt)    3 ln(distanceij) 
    
w wit     
x xjt     
zzijt   εijt
where i denotes the source; j denotes the destination country of bond in-
vestments; and t denotes time, which spans from 2001–2003 in the sample.
The variable bondijt is the cross-border holdings of long term debt securi-
ties from country i to country j at time t. The variable wit is a vector of
source country-speciﬁc explanatory variables, xit is a vector of destination
country-speciﬁc explanatory variables, and zit is a vector of bilateral ex-
planatory variables. The descriptions and sources of these explanatory
variables are listed in Appendix B. Finally, εijt is an error term, which can
be speciﬁed diﬀerently depending on the estimation method. For example,
in an OLS model εijt would be independently and identically distributed
IID(0,  ε
2)0. If we assume a destination-country ﬁxed-eﬀects model, then 
εijt   uj   vijt, where uj is constant for each destination country and vijt is in-
dependently and identically distributed IID(0,  v
2). In a random eﬀects
model, ujwould be drawn from IID(0,  2
it) where ujand all explanatory vari-
ables are uncorrelated with vijt.
9.4 Basic Results
To implement the gravity model, we will start with ordinary least
squares, then add destination-country random eﬀects and ﬁxed eﬀects
(where the latter forces us to eliminate time-invariant recipient country
variables), and ﬁnally use country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects (forcing us to drop
country pair variables that do not vary over time).
As shown in table 9.4,the basic gravity variables (country size, log of dis-
tance, land border dummy, common language dummy) behave well in our
pooled OLS speciﬁcations. In table 9.5 we add recipient country ﬁxed and
random eﬀects. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test sug-
gests that random eﬀects are preferred to pooled OLS, and Hausman’s
speciﬁcation test prefers ﬁxed eﬀects to random eﬀects. Table 9.6 reports
the baseline results using country-pair random eﬀects model.27
We ﬁnd, similar to results in the literature, that country size matters:
larger countries invest more in other countries’ bonds. At the same time,
larger countries attract more bond investment from other countries. The
results are similar whether we measure country size by GDP, land area, or
population. Distance between countries enters negatively, consistent with
the information-cost hypothesis. The coeﬃcients on the land-border
dummy are positive but not robust. This implies that contiguity is a less im-
portant determinant of information and transaction costs for ﬁnance than
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27. Again, the LM test rejects the null hypothesis of pooled OLS. The results with ﬁxed
eﬀects are not reported, as we are forced to drop all country-pair, time-invariant variables
(e.g., distance, intraregional dummy variables), many of which are of particular interest.trade (which makes sense in that physical transportation costs, which are
often minimized by contiguity, matter more for the latter).
The interest rate variables highlight the importance of push factors: in-
vestments do not always go to the countries with higher interest rates, but
they clearly come from countries with lower interest rates. We ﬁnd the same
when we instead use the average monthly return on home country bonds
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Table 9.4 Baseline results: Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log of GDP—source country 0.405 0.419 0.307
(38.71)** (36.48)** (27.43)**
log of GDP—destination country 0.636 0.654 0.524
(85.38)** (80.27)** (58.72)**
log of GDP, PPP—source country 0.384
(28.15)**
log of GDP, PPP—destination country 0.666
(67.91)**
log of GDP per capita—source country 0.900 0.764
(34.36)** (32.18)**
log of GDP per capita—destination country 0.902 0.445
(60.27)** (29.22)**
log of distance –0.579 –0.545 –0.470 –0.244 –0.456
(24.47)** (21.24)** (16.90)** (8.99)** (19.16)**
Land border dummy 0.133 0.198 0.266 1.277 0.535
(1.22) (1.74) (2.18)* (10.45)** (5.07)**
Common Language Dummy 0.415 0.335 0.445 0.151 0.259
(8.46)** (6.36)** (7.74)** (2.65)** (5.32)**
Control on bond transactions (inﬂow) –0.359 –0.411 –0.654 –0.009 0.012
(9.99)** (10.41)** (15.21)** (0.21) (8.92)**
Control on bond transactions (outﬂow) –0.806 –0.816 –1.079 –0.080 0.002
(20.15)** (18.56)** (22.42)** (1.48) (1.51)
LIBOR—Source country interest rate 0.020 0.021 0.012 –0.122
(14.38)** (13.77)** (7.93)** (3.19)**
Destination country interest rate—LIBOR –0.010 –0.018 –0.000 –0.149
(6.85)** (11.09)** (0.04) (3.21)**
Asia 0.860 0.643 0.803 2.305 1.112
(5.72)** (4.24)** (4.95)** (14.19)** (7.92)**
EU15 3.808 3.516 3.940 3.683 3.056
(43.57)** (39.34)** (41.43)** (38.20)** (36.69)**
Latin America –0.279 0.199 0.306 0.187 0.407
(2.83)** (1.80) (2.55)* (1.57) (3.98)**
Constant –19.034 –19.694 –20.157 –11.876 –25.709
(50.56)** (48.57)** (41.38)** (31.79)** (63.07)**
Observations 12,481 10,654 10,180 10,654 10,654
R-squared 0.58 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.67




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ETable 9.6 Baseline results: Country pair random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log of GDP—source country 0.407 0.438 0.301
(26.44)** (26.18)** (18.10)**
log of GDP—destination country 0.605 0.622 0.493
(55.29)** (52.30)** (37.61)**
log of GDP, PPP—source country 0.378
(19.44)**
log of GDP, PPP—destination country 0.623
(43.64)**
log of GDP per capita—source country 0.878 0.745
(25.92)** (23.31)**
log of GDP per capita—destination country 0.826 0.419
(41.21)** (19.99)**
log of distance –0.579 –0.604 –0.558 –0.292 –0.479
(16.58)** (16.09)** (13.84)** (7.38)** (13.79)**
Land border dummy 0.007 –0.037 –0.021 1.152 0.408
(0.04) (0.21) (0.11) (6.17)** (2.51)*
Common Language Dummy 0.467 0.434 0.561 0.180 0.288
(6.44)** (5.60)** (6.64)** (2.17)* (4.03)**
Control on bond transactions (inﬂow) –0.190 –0.264 –0.336 –0.106 –0.141
(5.66)** (7.00)** (8.14)** (2.71)** (3.80)**
Control on bond transactions (outﬂow) –0.488 –0.518 –0.574 –0.197 –0.225
(12.43)** (12.12)** (12.94)** (4.26)** (5.18)**
LIBOR—Source country interest rate 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002
(5.32)** (5.33)** (1.76) (2.41)*
Destination country interest rate—LIBOR –0.006 –0.009 –0.001 0.000
(3.86)** (5.87)** (0.68) (0.09)
Asia 0.769 0.581 0.655 2.442 1.213
(3.27)** (2.45)* (2.57)* (9.66)** (5.52)**
EU15 4.131 3.846 4.362 3.895 3.254
(29.60)** (26.88)** (28.68)** (25.39)** (24.47)**
Latin America –0.159 –0.046 –0.077 0.043 0.313
(1.10) (0.30) (0.46) (0.26) (2.21)*
Constant –18.611 –19.376 –18.803 –10.790 –24.340
(33.15)** (31.99)** (26.58)** (20.89)** (41.30)**
Observations 12,481 10,654 10,180 10,654 10,654
Number of group (country pair) 5,166 4,436 4,342 4,436 4,436
R2-overall 0.58 0.61 0.55 0.55 0.67
R2-within 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
R2-between 0.57 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.66
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 8,971.53 7,422.27 7,226.88 8,132.88 7,092.55
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%
**Signiﬁcant at 1%and the average monthly return on foreign country bonds in home country
currency (table 9.7).28 (We interpret the average monthly return as the his-
torical or backward-looking return and the interest diﬀerential as the con-
temporaneous or forward-looking return.) These results are consistent
with accounts emphasizing the importance of global factors and condi-
tions in the ﬁnancial centers as determinants of conditions in emerging
markets (see Calvo 1999). They are suggestive for a paper presented in the
summer of 2006, since the ﬁrst half of the year was marked by substantial
ﬂows into emerging market bonds and, in turn, prompted a debate over
whether this reﬂected mainly improved fundamentals in the emerging mar-
kets or the low level of interest rates and abundant liquidity in the advanced
economies. Our results provide some support for the second interpretation.
The correlation of bond returns enters positively in our equations, which
is easier to interpret in terms of return chasing than diversiﬁcation.29 This
is the correlation puzzle identiﬁed by McCauley and Jiang (2004) in their
analysis of bank-intermediated ﬂows. McCauley and Jiang (2004) observe
that arbitrage has done little to equalize returns between Asian local cur-
rency bonds and their industrial-country counterparts, consistent with this
ﬁnding, but they also suggest that this pattern should make diversiﬁcation
attractive; our results suggest that there has been little such diversiﬁcation
to date. This result is also consistent with interpretations of recent trends
emphasizing the high level of liquidity in the ﬁnancial centers in driving
ﬂows to emerging markets, as well as trend-chasing behavior as opposed to
diversiﬁcation motives.30
In contrast to the mixed results in studies of bank loans, for bond markets
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28. We measure past bond returns using total return indices, taking into account changes
in bilateral exchange rates by using own-currency returns for source countries and source-
country-currency returns for destination countries. For emerging market countries, we use
J. P. Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Indices (EMBI) total returns, which compute capital
gains and interest returns on U.S. dollar-denominated debt instruments issued by sovereign
and quasi-sovereign entities. For mature market countries, we use J. P. Morgan’s Government
Bond Indices (GBI), which track total returns on local currency government debt instru-
ments. For source countries we calculate returns from its bond index and, if applicable, con-
vert the returns into its own currency. For destination countries we use unhedged bond re-
turns in source country currency to take into account changes in bilateral exchange rates. In
principle, it would be desirable to measure the extent of hedging behavior directly, perhaps
using data on the level of activity on hedging markets. However, information on the activity
of such markets, and even on their existence, is available in systematic form only for a rela-
tively small subset of countries.
29. We compute the correlation of bond returns using the three-year rolling correlation of
the past total bond returns (as described earlier). Given expected returns and portfolio
weights, the lower the correlation of returns on two assets, the lower the variance of the port-
folio they comprise. Hence one would expect a risk adverse investor to choose foreign assets
with a lower return correlation with their local portfolio in order to diversify and minimize
portfolio risks. The positive coeﬃcient on the return correlation implies that investors choose
foreign bonds with returns more correlated with their local bond portfolio.
30. We should note that this result is also consistent with reverse causality, in the sense that
larger cross-border investments between two countries could result in higher correlations of
domestic and foreign returns.Table 9.7 Historical total bond returns vs. interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Destination Pair Destination Pair
FE RE FE RE
log of GDP—source country 0.961 1.013 0.976 1.038
(50.33)** (31.05)** (45.90)** (29.56)**
log of GDP—destination country 2.520 0.864 1.996 0.887
(2.98)** (28.28)** (2.17)* (26.15)**
log of distance –0.580 –0.560 –0.593 –0.611
(12.30)** (8.75)** (11.53)** (8.90)**
Land border dummy –0.146 –0.114 –0.188 –0.237
(1.00) (0.47) (1.22) (0.93)
Common Language Dummy 0.804 0.864 0.805 0.927
(9.60)** (6.69)** (9.12)** (6.83)**
Control on bond transactions (inﬂow) –0.184 –0.262 –0.060 –0.297
(0.79) (3.62)** (0.20) (3.58)**
Control on bond transactions (outﬂow) –1.624 –1.129 –1.589 –1.107
(25.88)** (15.06)** (23.97)** (14.04)**
Historical Bond Returns—source country –0.094 –0.013
(4.56)** (1.18)
Historical Bond Returns—destination country 0.043 0.016
(2.25)* (1.77)
LIBOR—Source country interest rate 0.006 –0.002
(2.69)** (0.98)
Destination country interest rate—LIBOR 0.007 0.003
(1.07) (1.17)
Correlation of Bond Returns 1.598 0.979 1.804 1.154
(11.70)** (7.73)** (12.19)** (8.38)**
Volatility of Bilateral Exchange Rates –0.101 –0.027 –0.054 –0.020
(5.74)** (2.90)** (3.17)** (2.09)*
Asia 1.416 0.817 1.391 0.710
(7.88)** (2.93)** (7.58)** (2.51)*
EU15 1.736 2.645 1.642 2.450
(11.88)** (13.19)** (10.63)** (11.71)**
Latin America –0.930 –0.661 –0.964 –0.897
(4.90)** (2.46)** (4.48)** (3.04)**
Constant –82.063 –41.079 –69.033 –41.933
(3.74)** (32.67)** (2.88)** (30.95)**
Observations 4,072 4,072 3,682 3,682
Number of groups 52 1,615 47 1,461
R2-overall 0.52 0.57 0.58 0.67
R2-within 0.65 0.04 0.65 0.04
R2-between 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.69
Hausman Speciﬁcation Test 41.36 29.79
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 2,592.41 2,309.43
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%
**Signiﬁcant at 1%we consistently ﬁnd that capital controls are important.31 The regressions
suggest that controls in both source and destination countries matter in an
anticipated fashion. Controls on outﬂows from the investing country al-
ways enter with the larger coeﬃcient (in absolute value terms), as if these
measures are especially binding. All this is consistent with ﬁndings in our
earlier paper on the domestic dimension of bond market development—
that capital controls are negatively associated with domestic bond-market
capitalization.
The volatility of the bilateral exchange rate enters with a strong negative
coeﬃcient.32 Again, this is consistent with our earlier analysis of domestic
bond-market capitalization, where we found that more volatile exchange
rates had a negative eﬀect (which we interpreted as evidence that exchange
rate volatility discourages foreign participation).
Interestingly, when we add the Asia dummy to the preceding speciﬁca-
tions, it enters with a positive coeﬃcient, as if Asian bond markets are
more integrated, so measured, than a randomly selected pair of bond mar-
kets.33 But this coeﬃcient goes to zero in table 9.8, where we include ﬁnan-
cial sector variables (domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a
percent of GDP and stock market capitalization as a percent of GDP).
When we add an analogous dummy for members of the European Union
(as of 2001–2003), it is also positive and signiﬁcant, and the point estimate
is even larger. In contrast to Asia, the EU dummy is not wiped out by
adding ﬁnancial sector measures. Thus, cross border participation in Eu-
rope appears to reﬂect more than simply the advanced nature of the re-
gion’s ﬁnancial sector and the absence of capital controls; it presumably
also reﬂects the extent of, inter alia, regulatory harmonization.34
In table 9.9, we add several proxies for the quality of institutions of the 
destination country.35 Not surprisingly, measures of the quality of insti-
tutions in the destination country are consistently important in explain-
ing cross-border holdings. Indices measuring law and order, corruption,
bureaucratic quality, and the investment risks (higher values mean better
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31. We use the lines for restrictions on capital transactions in bonds and other debt instru-
ments from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
The data are entered as a dummy variable where “1” means there is a restriction on capital
transactions in bonds and other debt instruments, and “0” means there is not.
32. The volatility of the bilateral exchange rate is measured as the annual standard devia-
tion of monthly changes of logs of bilateral exchange rates.
33. The Asia dummy is equal to 1 for Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Macao
SAR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand. Note
that it leaves out Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei, and Vietnam, for which data are spotty
and that do not participate fully in the region’s entire range of ﬁnancial-market initiatives.
34. The Latin America dummy is opposite in sign. It also tends to lose some of its statisti-
cal signiﬁcance when we add ﬁnancial sector variables, but not across the board.
35. While these recipient-country-speciﬁc control variables are not time-invariant, the vari-
ations over time are small compared to cross-country variations. Thus, results using a desti-
nation country ﬁxed eﬀects model may not be very meaningful. As a result, we will report the
results from the random eﬀects model only.Table 9.8 Development of ﬁnancial sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Destination Pair Destination Pair
RE RE RE RE
log of GDP—source country 0.303 0.366 0.387 0.454
(29.59)** (23.36)** (28.32)** (22.00)**
log of GDP—destination country 0.530 0.547 0.676 0.653
(20.32)** (45.33)** (15.24)** (33.87)**
log of distance –0.705 –0.590 –0.857 –0.740
(28.00)** (17.49)** (27.92)** (18.24)**
Land border dummy 0.107 0.115 0.027 0.048
(1.10) (0.71) (0.25) (0.27)
Common Language Dummy 0.286 0.364 0.331 0.369
(6.24)** (5.19)** (5.17)** (3.86)**
Control on bond transactions (inﬂow) –0.166 –0.174 –0.189 –0.231
(2.16)* (5.18)** (1.80) (4.85)**
Control on bond transactions (outﬂow) –0.657 –0.474 –0.938 –0.705
(18.10)** (12.01)** (19.98)** (13.36)**
Size of banking sector—source country 0.009 0.003 0.011 0.005
(29.14)** (11.13)** (24.99)** (11.29)**
Size of banking sector—destination country 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.003
(5.87)** (11.03)** (2.60)** (5.44)**
Size of stock market—source country 0.008 0.005
(20.75)** (11.87)**
Size of stock market—destination country 0.001 0.001
(1.23) (3.23)**
Asia 0.716 0.541 0.160 0.036
(4.99)** (2.39)* (1.02) (0.15)
EU15 3.110 3.917 2.606 3.357
(36.17)** (29.0)** (27.65)** (22.8)**
Latin America –0.269 0.036 –0.479 –0.080
(2.80)** (0.26) (3.35)** (0.42)
Constant –14.351 –16.744 –19.318 –20.752
(21.35)** (29.96)** (17.23)** (27.75)**
Observations 12,214 12,214 7,961 7,961
Number of Groups 153 5,088 96 3,499
R2-overall 0.62 0.61 0.063 0.62
R2-within 0.44 0.01 0.56 0.01
R2-between 0.80 0.60 0.78 0.63
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 20,862.50 8,336.51 13,797.59 4,952.58
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Number of group(pair); absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%
**Signiﬁcant at 1%Table 9.9 Quality of institutions: Destination country random effects (usual gravity model
variables not reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log of GDP per capita—source country 0.872
(27.37)**
log of GDP per capita—destination country 0.447
(11.37)**
Law and order risk 0.224 0.163 0.195
(11.21)** (8.37)** (6.59)**
Corruption risk –0.045 –0.214 0.021
(2.13)* (9.92)** (0.68)
Bureaucratic quality 0.237 –0.133 0.319
(7.71)** (4.05)** (7.09)**
Investment proﬁle 0.148 0.095 0.307
(10.36)** (6.85)** (15.47)**
LIBOR–Source country interest rate 0.025 0.007
(15.50)** (4.25)**
Destination country interest rate–LIBOR 0.011 0.009
(2.34)* (1.97)*
Sovereign Credit Ratings (S&P) 0.093 0.109
(5.49)** (6.56)**
English legal origin –0.418
(1.17)
French legal origin –0.155
(0.44)
German legal origin –0.208
(0.55)




Contract enforcement days –0.001
(2.09)*
Asia 1.405 1.532 0.811 1.533 0.920
(9.82)** (11.06)** (4.78)** (9.52)** (5.96)**
EU15 3.069 2.917 2.598 2.386 3.164
(35.97)** (35.28)** (24.31)** (23.72)** (33.14)**
Latin America 0.403 0.299 0.180 1.159 –0.697
(3.95)** (3.02)** (1.31) (8.59)** (6.04)**
Constant –22.425 –24.410 –22.685 –30.615 –21.381
(33.81)** (39.90)** (21.77)** (28.89)** (23.13)**
Observations 12,343 12,343 7,159 7,048 10,420
Number of destination countries 156 156 75 75 121
R2-overall 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.60
R2-within 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.56 0.42
R2-between 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.81
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 30,081.25 19,210.76 5,777.85 8,106.69 13,159.93
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%
**Signiﬁcant at 1%institutions) all tend to enter with positive coeﬃcients.36 We similarly ob-
tain a negative coeﬃcient on the number of days required to enforce a con-
tract (from Djankov et al. 2005).37
Even when we control for institutional quality and interest rates, credit
ratings continue to matter. The direction of the eﬀect is plausible: higher
ratings mean higher foreign holdings. It may be that the rating agencies are
capturing something in addition to the standard measures of institutional
quality, or it could be that restrictive covenants preventing institutional in-
vestors from holding bonds of issuers with sub-investment-grade ratings
are driving this result.
Interestingly, the intraregional dummy variable for Latin America turns
positive and signiﬁcant when we control for the quality of institutions. The
importance of institutional weaknesses for various aspects of bond market
development in Latin America has been widely remarked upon. Thus, de la
Torre and Schmuker (2004) observe that the high cost of judicial proceed-
ings is a factor discouraging foreign investors from holding the bonds of a
number of Latin American countries. Inter-American Development Bank
(2005) observes that Latin America fares poorly when rated on both in-
vestor and creditor rights. In both cases the highest ranked Latin American
country—Chile—has values according to the standard indices that are
lower than the Asian average. Eichengreen, Borensztein, and Panizza
(2006) show that Latin American countries comply less fully with interna-
tional accounting standards than do their Asian counterparts. What is in-
teresting here is that the low level of ﬁnancial integration in Latin America
is fully (indeed, more than fully) explained by the low quality of institutions.
9.5 Sensitivity Checks
We now provide a series of robustness checks of the results reported
above.
1. We adjust the standard errors for the fact that a number of our insti-
tutional variables do not vary over time by clustering on destination coun-
tries.38 Clustering increases the standard errors on the institutional vari-
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36. An exception is the corruption measure. However, there appears to be strong colinear-
ity between per capita income and the institutional variables (not surprisingly): the sign and
signiﬁcance of the latter are sensitive to whether per capita income is included (since this is
associated with other hard-to-observe dimensions of the strength of institutions).
37. The measures of legal origin, which are negative for both English and French law (where
Nordic law is the omitted alternative), are hard to reconcile with the standard La Porta et al.
(1999) view. Recall that these same variables similarly entered with counterintuitive signs in
our earlier study using domestic-capitalization data and that Djankov et al. (2005) also ﬁnd
that these variables do not always have the anticipated eﬀects. The mystery deepens.
38. In other words, we assume that observations are independent across destination coun-
tries, but not necessarily within them.ables, as expected, but few of the latter lose their statistical signiﬁcance.39
Overall, the results are very similar to before.
2.We check for selectivity, which may be important given that only some
seventy source countries (of some 180-plus IMF members) participated in
the CPIS surveys. We reestimated the basic equations using a Heckman se-
lectivity correction. From the ﬁrst-stage selection equations, we ﬁnd, plau-
sibly, that countries participating in the survey are larger, richer, and have
larger banking systems and stock markets. But even after controlling for
these selection criteria, the results remain similar to those obtained before.
The results are reported in table 9.10.
3.We experiment with alternative measures of the de facto exchange rate
regime. When we replace exchange rate variability, the measure used above,
with dummy variables constructed on the basis of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s
exchange rate regime classiﬁcation, the results remain basically the same.40
We ﬁnd that pegged exchange rates have positive eﬀects on cross-border
bond holdings (compared to ﬂoating and managed ﬂoating regimes), while
regimes of limited ﬂexibility enter with signiﬁcantly negative signs.41 See
table 9.11.
4. We experiment with alternative measures of policies toward the capi-
tal account. For example, we substitute the alternative measures of the ab-
sence of restrictions on all inﬂows and outﬂows as well as the ﬁnancial
openness index kindly made available by Nancy Brune.42 Again, the results
are largely the same. We then substitute Chinn and Ito’s (2005) measure of
ﬁnancial openness.43 Once again, the results are consistent with before: as
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39. The results, while not reported, are available on request.
40. We use the update through 2003 of the Reinhart and Rogoﬀ de facto classiﬁcation of
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006). For tractability we reclassify their more detailed clas-
siﬁcations into three main categories: peg, limited ﬂexibility, and ﬂoating/managed ﬂoating,
and assign a dummy variable for each category. Floating/managed ﬂoating is the alternative
omitted from the regressions.
41. These results, however, are not robust to the measures of the rate of return. The coefﬁcients
lose their signiﬁcance when we use historical returns instead of the interest rate diﬀerential.
42. The measure of capital openness of all inﬂows is the sum of ﬁve dummy variables, mea-
suring controls on inﬂows of invisible transactions, controls on inﬂows of export transactions,
controls on inﬂows pertaining to capital and money market securities, controls on inﬂows
pertaining to credit operations, and controls on inward direct investment. For each compo-
nent, a value of one means open (no restriction) while zero means closed (restriction in place).
The resulting measure ranges from zero to ﬁve, where higher values imply more open capital
account on inﬂow transactions. Similarly, the measure of capital openness of all outﬂows is
the sum of four variables: controls on outﬂows of all transactions mentioned previously, ex-
cept export transactions. The resulting measure ranges from zero to four, where higher values
imply a more open capital account on outﬂow transactions. The ﬁnancial openness index is
the sum of the measures of capital openness of inﬂows and outﬂows as well as dummy vari-
ables indicating controls on inward direct investment, controls on outward direct investment,
controls on real estate transactions, provisions speciﬁc to commercial banks, and exchange
rate structure (where this last variable takes on a value of zero if a country has dual or mul-
tiple exchange rates). The resulting index ranges from zero to twelve.
43. A note on calculation of this measure is available at http://www.pdx.edu/~ito/
Readme_kaopen163.pdf.Table 9.10 Heckman selectivity bias correction
(1) (2) (3)
log of GDP—source country 0.152 0.232 0.704
(10.39)** (18.48)** (21.65)**
log of GDP—destination country 0.637 0.637 0.906
(87.98)** (87.81)** (41.79)**
log of distance –0.540 –0.546 –0.659
(23.57)** (23.72)** (14.59)**
Land border dummy 0.275 0.381 –0.046
(2.61)** (3.63)** (0.29)
Common Language Dummy 0.401 0.326 0.615
(8.33)** (6.67)** (7.10)**
Control on bond transactions (inﬂow) –0.380 –0.385 –0.526
(10.80)** (10.95)** (7.68)**
Control on bond transactions (outﬂow) –0.430 –0.458 –0.825
(10.46)** (11.17)** (10.79)**
LIBOR—Source country interest rate 0.026
(7.61)**
Destination country interest rate—LIBOR 0.011
(4.15)**
Correlation of Bond Returns 1.547
(10.47)**
Volatility of Bilateral Exchange Rates –0.069
(4.13)**
Asia 0.968 0.874 0.354
(6.68)** (6.04)** (2.07)*
EU15 3.607 3.551 1.448
(41.34)** (40.87)** (9.53)**
Latin America –0.035 –0.155 –0.275
(0.38) (1.53) (1.33)
Constant –12.308 –14.431 –32.144
(26.44)** (34.39)** (28.66)**
Selection Equation
log of GDP—source country 0.404 0.267 0.367
(80.29)** (39.67)** (34.14)**
log of GDP per capita—source country 0.764 0.718 0.673
(94.78)** (66.70)** (46.07)**
Market Capitalization 0.003 0.007
(9.97)** (13.63)**
Domestic Bank Credit 0.008 0.005
(29.70)** (11.58)**
Constant –16.967 –13.715 –16.363
(124.07)** (72.32)** (55.30)**
Observations 93,791 35,435 26,902










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































%expected, ﬁnancial openness has a positive eﬀect on foreign holdings of
portfolio debt securities. Again, see table 9.11.
5. We add a lagged dependent variable to see whether the patterns we de-
tect are robust to a model that explicitly allows for hysteresis or habit for-
mation. Previous work on the determinants of bilateral trade ﬂows using
purely cross section data (e.g., Eichengreen and Irwin 1996) showed that
such habit formation can be important in practice. To see whether this
holds in the present context, we add the lagged dependent variable to a
cross section regression estimated on 2003 data.44To correct for the bias re-
sulting from adding a lagged dependent variable, we also instrument for
the lagged dependent variable using the lagged independent variables and
two-stage least squares. The results are shown in table 9.12. In all speciﬁ-
cations, we ﬁnd that there is strong evidence of habit formation. While
most other coeﬃcients remain unchanged, the Asia dummy becomes in-
signiﬁcant when we control for bond holdings in the previous year. This
suggests that whatever is distinctive about cross-border bond holdings
within Asia is persistent over time.
6. Although central bank reserves are excluded from the CPIS data, it
still could be, as noted above, that large reserves are a signal that exchange
rates will be relatively stable, capital markets will remain open, and liquid-
ity will be ensured through backstopping operations. Countries with am-
ple reserves will be more sanguine, intuition suggests, about policies of be-
nign neglect toward outward investment. On the inward investment side,
some authors (e.g., Dooley and Garber 2005) have argued that reserves
should be thought of as collateral, so that high reserve levels make it easier
for emerging markets to access foreign ﬁnancial markets. We therefore add
reserves scaled by GDP in the sending and receiving countries to our base-
line speciﬁcation. As shown in the ﬁrst column of table 9.13,the coeﬃcient
on the reserves of the sending country is positive and signiﬁcant; as ex-
pected, countries with ample reserves can invest abroad with fewer worries.
However, reserves in the receiving country enter negatively, which is in-
consistent with the collateral hypothesis.
7. We explored further possible interpretations of the coeﬃcient on dis-
tance. In table 9.13, we also added to the basic framework measures of in-
coming and outgoing telephone traﬃc and the cost of telephone calls on the
grounds that these tell us something about the information ﬂows that are im-
portant in portfolio investment decisions, and that this may be what the dis-
tance variable is picking up. These additional variables also enter with the ex-
pected signs (positive and negative, respectively) and are strongly signiﬁcant.
But the distance variable is still negative and signiﬁcant as well. This suggests
294 Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai
44. We also add a lagged dependent variable to the panel estimates. However, this may cre-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ethat distance is picking up something besides information communicated
through these channels.
8. One possibility is that distance is simply a stand-in for the additional
diﬃculty of investing across time zones. Insofar as claims on countries are
traded primarily in their own time zones, portfolio managers and others
may ﬁnd it inconvenient to get up in the middle of the night to check mar-
ket conditions and transact. Those impressed by the ease of obtaining in-
formation on far distant markets in the internet age may be inclined toward
this alternative interpretation. We therefore experimented with a measure
of the number of time zones separating the source and destination markets
(see table 9.13). When this is substituted for distance in our basic speciﬁ-
cations, it is again negative and signiﬁcant (not surprisingly, as distance
and time zone diﬀerences are positively correlated). But when we include
both distance and time zone diﬀerences, the former is still signiﬁcantly neg-
ative, as before, while the latter is not positive and signiﬁcant. It would ap-
pear, in other words, that distance is not simply a proxy for time zone
diﬀerences. The positive coeﬃcient on the latter appears to be capturing a
tendency for investors to prefer transactions with countries to their east
and west rather than to their north or south, although why this should be
the case remains an open question.45
9.6 Connections with Other Aspects of Financial Development
In this section we consider further variables and speciﬁcations designed
to shed light on the impact of other aspects of ﬁnancial development on
bond market integration.
We ﬁrst ask whether stock and bond markets are substitutes or comple-
ments. We start by adding the value of listed companies in the source and
destination countries as a way of capturing the depth of their ﬁnancial
markets. Both variables enter positively (table 9.14), but it is the size of
stock markets in the source (investing) country that seems to matter. This
may indicate that these countries have an active institutional investor com-
munity inclined to take positions in the securities issued by foreign coun-
tries. We attempt to provide more direct evidence on this in the following.
We also ask, again following up on our previous work, whether having 
a large and well-developing banking system encourages or discourages
eﬀorts to place bonds with foreign investors. For both the source and des-
tination countries, domestic credit provided by the banking sector as 
a share of GDP is positive, suggesting that a large and active banking sys-
tem encourages foreign participation in domestic bond markets. This is the
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45. In particular, this result is not being driven by the inclusion of the major ﬁnancial cen-
ters (the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan) in the sample. The results are largely the
same when we exclude them from the sample (see table 9.13).Table 9.14 Financial development: Recipient country random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log of GDP—source country 0.317 0.336 0.326 0.418
(28.42)** (19.75)** (28.13)** (28.51)**
log of GDP—destination country 0.560 0.648 0.605 0.726
(20.24)** (17.96)** (21.28)** (16.13)**
log of distance –0.673 –0.664 –0.664 –0.834
(24.14)** (20.25)** (23.36)** (24.91)**
Land border dummy 0.175 0.228 0.178 0.074
(1.71) (2.04)* (1.72) (0.64)
Common Language Dummy 0.271 0.431 0.288 0.273
(5.46)** (6.39)** (5.62)** (4.09)**
Control on bond transactions (inﬂow) –0.239 –0.241 –0.249 –0.306
(2.77)** (2.28)* (2.90)** (2.67)**
Control on bond transactions (outﬂow) –0.683 –0.840 –0.724 –0.876
(17.20)** (15.66)** (17.75)** (16.89)**
LIBOR—Source country interest rate 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.019
(9.48)** (9.94)** (6.10)** (7.53)**
Destination country interest rate—LIBOR –0.005 –0.004 –0.005 –0.003
(1.53) (0.96) (1.51) (0.43)
Size of Banking Sector—source country 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.010
(26.04)** (24.73)** (23.40)** (21.17)**
Size of Banking Sector—destination country 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003
(4.78)** (4.32)** (4.69)** (2.07)*
Bank Concentration Index—source country –0.325
(2.31)*
Bank Concentration Index—destination country –0.224
(0.80)
Share of public bank assets—source country –0.013
(9.28)**
Share of public bank assets—destination country –0.007
(3.65)**




Asia 0.692 0.539 0.736 0.121
(4.73)** (3.37)** (4.98)** (0.77)
EU15 3.015 2.752 2.932 2.513
(33.99)** (28.35)** (32.70)** (26.20)**
Latin America 0.042 0.275 0.160 –0.201
(0.39) (2.29)* (1.46) (1.25)
Constant –15.371 –18.222 –16.542 –21.137
(21.24)** (17.70)** (22.11)** (18.21)**
Observations 10,557 7,553 10,102 7,038
Number of Destination Country 132 89 124 85
R2-overall 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65
R2-within 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.57
R2-between 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.82
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 16,397.08 9,351.59 11,799.28 10,667.40
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%
**Signiﬁcant at 1%same thing found in our previous study on the size of domestic bond mar-
kets. There we suggested a number of reasons why this might be so. Banks
are producers of information about conditions in ﬁnancial markets and
about the characteristics of ﬁnancial instruments that may be particularly
valuable to foreign investors. They provide underwriting services for do-
mestic issuers, advising the issuer on the terms and timing of the oﬀer. They
provide bridge ﬁnance in the period when the marketing of bonds is still
underway. They provide distribution channels for government bonds and
form an important part of the primary dealer network. Their institutional
support may also be conducive to secondary-market liquidity. Finally and
most directly, banks owing to their relatively large size can be major issuers
of bonds themselves.
Conversely, there is the fear that an ineﬃcient banking system may hin-
der bond market development and participation, and that an imperfectly
competitive system, in which banks have signiﬁcant market power, may al-
low them to use their incumbency advantage to hinder the advance of se-
curitization and disintermediation.46 We therefore constructed measures
of the concentration of the banking system in both the source and desti-
nation countries (as a Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index of commercial bank
assets, using data from Bankscope—thus, a higher value indicates greater
concentration). Here, measures for both the source and destination coun-
tries enter negatively as expected, although the signs and levels of statisti-
cal signiﬁcance are sensitive to what control variables are included. We
similarly added the share of bank assets accounted for by public-sector
banks as an additional measure of banking sector eﬃciency.47 Again, this
enters in the expected fashion (negatively). It suggests interpreting this set
of results in terms of the negative impact of a relatively ineﬃcient banking
system on various aspects of bond market development, more than in
terms of strategic behavior by banks with market power.
While our other results remain unchanged, the negative coeﬃcient on
cross-holdings within Latin America now goes to zero even without the
addition of measures of the quality of institutions.48 Borensztein, Eichen-
green, and Panizza (2006a) show that Latin America generally looks bet-
ter in terms of other dimensions of bond market development when one
controls for the underdevelopment of the region’s ﬁnancial system.49 We
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46. They may do so by limiting access to the payment system and by supporting the main-
tenance of regulations that increase the cost of underwriting and issuance (Schinasi and
Smith 1998; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2004).
47. We compute country-level public bank assets by summing assets of commercial banks
with a share of public ownership of more than 50 percent, using the data from Micco, Panizza,
and Yañez (2004).
48. Sometimes we even get a signiﬁcantly positive, albeit small, coeﬃcient.
49. Another way of putting the point is that the region’s bond markets are underdeveloped
for the same reasons that the rest of the region’s ﬁnancial system is underdeveloped (those rea-
sons having to do with the institutional variables that also caused the coeﬃcients for intra-
Latin American cross holdings to go to zero in section 9.4 above).ﬁnd the same thing here. Note that institutional (and other) factors stunt-
ing the development of the banking system do not appear to be what is hold-
ing back bond market integration in Asia (the coeﬃcients on the dummy
variable for intra-Asian cross holdings is little diﬀerent than before).
9.7 The Composition of the Investor Base
Another approach to analyzing the importance of institutional factors
is to make use of the fact that the CPIS reports data by type of institutional
investor (banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds). East Asia and
other regions are making considerable eﬀorts to cultivate the participation
of institutional investors in their bond markets. We can use the CPIS data
to analyze the importance of these agents for cross-border investment both
within the region and globally.
In table 9.15 we run three parallel regressions for the three categories of
holders—banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds—estimating
them by seemingly unrelated regression to capitalize on the correlation of
disturbance terms across types of holders for given country pairs. These re-
sults should be interpreted cautiously, since the sample size is now consid-
erably smaller than before. (There turn out to be a non-negligible number
of empty cells when we disaggregate by type of investor.)
The results show that the basic gravity variables are well behaved (virtu-
ally without exception the signs remain the same as before). When we turn
to the dummy variables for intraregional cross holdings, the comparison of
Asia and Europe is particularly interesting. For banks, insurance compa-
nies, and mutual funds alike, we get large positive coeﬃcients for intrare-
gional positions in bond markets in Europe. In Asia, however, we get a pos-
itive coeﬃcient for insurance companies but a strongly negative coeﬃcient
for mutual funds. This points to the development and behavior of the mu-
tual fund industry as a potential constraint on bond market development
in the region. We want to be careful here and to reiterate the provisional
nature of these ﬁndings, since we have information on the foreign asset po-
sitions of mutual funds for only a limited number of Asian countries. Still,
the results appear to make sense; in a number of Asian countries assets un-
der management by insurance companies remain signiﬁcant larger than
those under management by mutual funds. Total assets under management
by mutual funds are of roughly the same size relative to GDP in East Asia
and Latin America (IMF 2005). Despite the fact that Latin American ﬁ-
nancial markets are relatively underdeveloped along a number of other di-
mensions, regulators there have taken aggressive steps to encourage the
participation of institutional investors, mutual funds, and pension funds in
particular.50But, in both regions, cross-border investment by mutual funds
302 Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































scontinues to be hindered by a dearth of appropriate assets.51 Note that the
Asian Bond Fund, by creating a set of passively managed index funds of
regional bonds, is designed to address precisely this problem.52
9.8 Conclusions and Policy Implications
The development of bond markets can be gauged in a number of ways.
In this chapter we have concentrated on the international dimension. We
used data on the extent to which residents of one country hold the bonds
of issuers resident in another as a measure of ﬁnancial integration or in-
terrelatedness, asking how Asia compares with Europe and Latin Amer-
ica, and with the base case in which the purchaser and issuer of the bonds
reside in diﬀerent regions. It is no surprise that Europe is head and shoul-
ders above other regions in terms of ﬁnancial integration. More interesting
is that Asia already seems to have made some progress on this front com-
pared to Latin America and the world as a whole. The contrast with Latin
America is largely explained by stronger creditor and investor rights, more
expeditious and less costly contract enforcement, and greater trans-
parency that lead to larger and better developed ﬁnancial systems in Asia,
something that is conducive to foreign participation in local markets and
to intraregional cross holdings of Asian bonds generally. Further results
based on a limited sample suggest that one factor holding back investment
in foreign bonds in East Asia may be limited geographical diversiﬁcation
by mutual funds, in turn reﬂecting a dearth of appropriate assets. Asian
Bond Fund 2, by creating a passively managed portfolio of local currency
bonds potentially attractive to mutual fund managers and investors, may
help to relax this constraint.
We also ﬁnd evidence that cross-holdings are heavily driven by ﬁnancial
conditions in the investing country, which suggests that bond market con-
ditions could adjust abruptly for reasons having nothing to do with poli-
cies in the borrowing economy. Our results also indicate that bondholders
are attracted to the securities of countries whose returns co-vary with their
own, suggesting return chasing rather than diversiﬁcation behavior. These
are reasons for skepticism that the development of bond markets is a
panacea for stabilizing capital ﬂows.
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51. A problem that is compounded by the existence of restrictive covenants that limit the
classes of assets in which funds can invest.
52. As noted above, Asian Bond Fund 2 has two components: a $1 billion central bank re-
serve pool to be overseen by professional managers for local bond allocation, and a $1 billion
index unit designed to list on eight stock exchanges beginning with Hong Kong. The regional
index is designed to provide a benchmark structure for tracking pan-Asian performance as
well as facilitating one-stop entry for retail and institutional buyers in particular.Appendix A
Table 9A.1 List of Participants in CPIS
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 1 1 1
Aruba 1 1 1
Australia 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1
Bahamas, The 1 1 1
Bahrain 1 0 0
Barbados 0 0 1
Belgium 1 1 1
Bermuda 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 1 1
Canada 1 1 1
Cayman Islands 1 1 1
Chile 1 1 1
Colombia 1 1 1
Costa Rica 1 1 1
Cyprus 1 1 1
Czech Republic 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1
Egypt 1 1 1
Estonia 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 1
France 1 1 1
Germany 1 1 1
G r e e c e 111
Guernsey 1 1 1
Hong Kong SAR of China 1 1 1
Hungary 1 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1
Isle of Man 1 1 1
Israel 1 1 1
Italy 1 1 1
Japan 1 1 1
Jersey 1 1 1
Kazakhstan 1 1 1
Korea, Republic of 1 1 1
Lebanon 1 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1 1
Macao SAR of China 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 1 1
Malta 1 1 1
Mauritius 1 1 1
Mexico 0 0 1
Netherlands 1 1 1
Netherlands Antilles 1 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 1
Norway 1 1 1
Pakistan 0 1 1
Panama 1 1 1
Philippines 1 1 1
Poland 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1
Romania 1 1 1
Russian Federation 1 1 1
Singapore 1 1 1
Slovak Republic 1 1 1
South Africa 1 1 1
Spain 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1
Switzerland 1 1 1
Thailand 1 1 1
T u r k e y 111
Ukraine 1 1 1
United Kingdom 1 1 1
United States 1 1 1
Uruguay 1 1 1
V a n u a t u 111
Venezuela 1 1 1









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aviat, A., and N. Coeurdacier. 2005. The geography of trade in goods and asset
holdings. CNRS-EHESS-PNPC-ENS. Unpublished Manuscript.
Borensztein, E., B. Eichengreen, and U. Panizza. 2006a. Building bond markets in
Latin America. Inter-American Development Bank. Unpublished Manuscript,
March.
———. 2006b. Debt instruments and policies for the new millennium: New mar-
kets and new opportunities. Inter-American Development Bank. Unpublished
Manuscript, March.
Buch, C. 2000a. Are banks diﬀerent? Evidence from international data. Kiel Work-
ing Paper no. 1012. Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute of World Economics.
———. 2000b. Information or regulation: What is driving the international activi-
ties of commercial banks? Kiel Working Paper no. 1011. Kiel, Germany: Kiel In-
stitute of World Economics.
Buchanan, M. 2005. Emerging markets and the global economy—Hysteresis not
hysteria. Global Economics Weekly, 30 November.
Calvo, G. 1999. Contagion in emerging markets: When Wall Street is a carrier. Uni-
versity of Maryland, Department of Economics. Unpublished Manuscript, May.
Calvo, G., L. Liederman, and C. Reinhart. 1994. Capital inﬂows and real exchange
rate appreciation in Latin America. IMF Staﬀ Papers 40:108–51. Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund.
Chinn, M., and H. Ito. 2005. What matters for ﬁnancial development? Capital con-
trols, institutions, and interactions. NBER Working Paper no. 11370. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Coeurdacier, N., and S. Guibaud. 2005. International equity holdings and stock re-
turn correlations: Does diversiﬁcation matter at all for portfolio choice? PSE-
ENS-EHESS. Unpublished Manuscript, July.
De la Torre, A., and S. Schmukler. 2004. Whither Latin American Capital Markets?
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Djankov, S., C. McLiesh, and A. Shleifer. 2005. Private credit in 129 countries.
NBER Working Paper no. 11078. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, January.
Dooley, M., and P. Garber. 2005. Is it 1958 or 1968? Three notes on the longevity
of the revived Bretton Woods system. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
1:147–87.
Eichengreen, B., E. Borensztein, and U. Panizza. 2006. A tale of two markets: Bond
market development in Latin America and East Asia. Hong Kong Institute for
Monetary Research. Occasional Paper no. 3, October.
Eichengreen, B., and D. Irwin. The role of history in bilateral trade ﬂows. NBER
Working Paper no. 5565. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, May.
Eichengreen, B., and P. Luengnaruemitchai. 2004. Why doesn’t Asia have bigger
bond markets? NBER Working Paper no. 10576. Cambridge, MA: National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Eichengreen, B., and Y. C. Park. 2005. Why has there been less ﬁnancial integration
in East Asia than in Europe? In A new ﬁnancial market structure for East Asia,
eds. Y. C. Park, T. Ito, and Y. Wang, 84–103. Cheltenham, England: Edward El-
gar.
Eichengreen, B., and R. Razo-Garcia. 2006. The International Monetary System
in the last and next 20 years. Economic Policy 47 (July): 393–442.
Faruqee, H., S. Li, and I. K. Yan. 2004. The determinants of international portfo-
Bond Markets as Conduits for Capital Flows: How Does Asia Compare? 309lio holdings and home bias. IMF Working Paper no. WP/04/34. Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund., February.
Ferrucci, G. 2004. Understanding capital ﬂows to emerging market economies. Fi-
nancial Stability Review (June): 89–97.
Ghosh, S., and H. Wolf. 2000. Is there a curse of location? Spatial determinants of
capital ﬂows to emerging markets. In Capital ﬂows and the emerging economies,
ed. Sebastian Edwards, 137–58. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goldstein, M., and P. Turner. 2004. Controlling currency mismatches in emerging
market economies: An alternative to the original sin hypothesis. Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics.
Inter-American Development Bank. 2005. Unlocking credit: The quest for deep and
stable bank lending. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
International Monetary Fund. 2005. Development of corporate bond markets in
emerging market economies. Global ﬁnancial stability report, 103–41. Washing-
ton, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Izquierdo, A., J. Morriset, and M. Olarreaga. 2003. Information diﬀusion in inter-
national markets. Working Paper no. 488, Research Department. Washington,
DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Jeanneau, S., and M. Micu. 2002. Determinants of international bank lending to
emerging market countries. BIS Working Paper no. 112, June.
Kawai, M., and L.-G. Liu. 2001. Determinants of international commercial bank
loans to developing countries. University of Tokyo and Asian Development
Bank Institute. Unpublished Manuscript, June.
Kim, S., J.-W. Lee, and K. Shin. 2005. Regional and global ﬁnancial integration in
East Asia. Korea University, Department of Economics. Unpublished Manu-
script.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1999. Investor pro-
tection: Origins, consequences and reform. NBER Working Paper no. 7429.
Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, December.
Lane, P. R., and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti. 2004. International investment patterns.
CEPR Discussion Paper no. 4499. London: Centre for Economic Policy Re-
search.
Lui, L.-G. (2005). Impact of ﬁnancial services trade liberalization on capital ﬂows:
The case of China’s banking sector. Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Unpub-
lished Manuscript.
Papaioannou, E. 2005. What drives international bank ﬂows? Politics, institutions
and other determinants. Working Paper no. 437. Frankfurt: ECB.
Martin, P., and H. Rey. 2004. Financial super-markets: Size matters for asset trade.
Journal of International Economics 64:335–61.
McCauley, R., and G. Jiang. 2004. Diversifying with Asian local currency bonds.
BIS Quarterly Review, September: 51–66.
Micco, A., U. Panizza, and M. Yañez. 2004. Bank ownership and performance.
IADB Working Paper no. 518. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development
Bank.
Portes, R., and H. Rey. 2005. The determinants of cross-border equity ﬂows. Jour-
nal of International Economics 65:269–95.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales. 2003. Banks and markets: The changing character of
European ﬁnance. NBER Working Paper no. 9595. Washington, DC: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Reinhart, C. M., and K. S. Rogoff, (2002) . The modern history of exchange rate ar-
rangements: A reinterpretation. NBER Working Paper no. 8963. Washington,
DC: National Bureau of Economic Research.
310 Barry Eichengreen and Pipat LuengnaruemitchaiRose, A., and M. Spiegel. 2004. A gravity model of sovereign lending: Trade, de-
fault and credit. IMF StaﬀPapers 51 (special issue): 50–63. Washington, DC: In-
ternational Monetary Fund.
Schinasi, G., and T. Smith. 1998. Fixed income markets in the United States, Eu-
rope and Japan: Some lessons for emerging markets. IMF Working Paper no.
98–173. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Comment Eiji Ogawa
This chapter focuses on an international aspect of the Asian bond markets
to investigate how capital ﬂows for Asia in comparison with other regions
such as Europe and Latin America. In this chapter, the authors assessed
bond markets as a conduit for capital ﬂows. They have already written a
paper that focused on a domestic aspect of the Asian bond markets. This
chapter is complementary to that previous study.
The monetary authorities of East Asian countries have recognized the
underlying problems caused by a double overdependence on the banking
sector in their ﬁnancial systems and on the U.S. dollar in their currency sys-
tems since East Asian economies experienced the Asian Currency Crisis in
1997. We have the problem of how eﬃciently we should match savings with
investments within East Asia through regional ﬁnancial markets, although
there are both an abundance of savings in East Asia and proﬁtable invest-
ment opportunities in East Asian emerging market countries. One solution
should be to establish and activate regional bond markets in East Asia.
The monetary authorities of East Asian countries are actually promot-
ing the Asian Bond Market Initiative, that is, a regional ﬁnancial coopera-
tion to establish Asian bond markets in East Asia. Recent discussions of
the Asian Bond Market Initiative have focused on the choice of denomi-
nation currency and the credit guarantee and rating agency. Ito (2003) pro-
posed an Asian bond designed to be a fund of the local currency denomi-
nated bonds issued by governments of East Asian countries. However, as
an initiative of the EMEAP, the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) was launched in
its ﬁrst version (ABF1) in June 2003 as a basket of U.S. dollar denominated
bonds issued by Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities in EMEAP
economies (excluding Australia, Japan and New Zealand). The EMEAP
has worked to extend the ABF concept to bonds denominated in local cur-
rencies and has announced the launch of the second stage of ABF (ABF2)
in December 2004.
In this chapter, the authors used bilateral data to analyze the importance
of a range of factors determining nonresident holdings of a country’s
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Eiji Ogawa is a professor in the Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Hitotsu-
bashi University.bonds as well as analyzing the determinants of holdings across regions.
They used the gravity model to analyze determinants of cross-border cap-
ital ﬂows. They used the log of bilateral international portfolio holdings of
long-term debt securities as the dependent variable. The data came from
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) compiled by the IMF
for the years 2001–2003. The gravity model, augmented by various control
variables used in the literature, were estimated.
The authors obtained interesting analytical results from the estimation
of the gravity model. Country size matters in determining capital ﬂows.
Distance between countries has negative eﬀects on capital ﬂows. The in-
terest rate variables in source countries have stronger eﬀects on capital
ﬂows. Capital controls on bond transactions have negative eﬀect on capi-
tal ﬂows. The volatility of the bilateral exchange rates has negative eﬀects
on capital ﬂows. As for the Asia dummy, it enters with a positive coeﬃ-
cient. However, this coeﬃcient goes to zero when control variables of “size
of stock market” are included. Measures of the quality of institutions in the
destination country are important in explaining capital ﬂows. Insurance
companies and mutual funds have asymmetric eﬀects on capital ﬂows in
Asia. The former has a positive eﬀect while the latter has a negative eﬀect.
I have ﬁve comments for the authors.
The ﬁrst comment is related to using the gravity model to analyze deter-
minants of capital ﬂows. The gravity model is used to analyze determinants
of bilateral capital ﬂows in a framework where both sizes of the two econ-
omies and a distance between the two economies basically determine trade
volumes between them. It is supposed that investors have only options of
investing into their home and one foreign country. Rather, investors make
international portfolio investments to diversify foreign assets for risk man-
agement. I question whether the gravity model is consistent with the inter-
national portfolio investments into several foreign countries. For example,
assuming a very simple case where a portfolio share of the international
portfolio investments to one country is a constant, total size of investments
from one country to the rest of the world should have eﬀects on capital
ﬂows from one country to another.
The second comment is related to calculation of bond returns. Capital
ﬂows are in theory aﬀected by expected return diﬀerentials that are the in-
terest rate diﬀerentials plus the expected rate of change in exchange rates.
It seems to be inconsistent with the chapter’s investigation of whether in-
terest rate variables work as push factors or pull factors when determining
capital ﬂows. In addition, the expected rate of change in exchange rates
should be considered when analyzing the eﬀect of bond returns on capital
ﬂows. The authors should take into account the expected rate of change in
exchange rates when calculating the bond returns.
The third comment is related to the Asia dummy. The Asia dummy refers
to capital ﬂows from one Asian country to the other Asian countries. The
312 Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchaiauthors used the Asia dummy to investigate characteristics of the intrare-
gional capital ﬂows in Asia. The dummy is an intercept dummy. They can
use coeﬃcient dummies by set cross-terms that are products of the Asia
dummy and explanatory variables. They should use cross terms such as the
Asia dummy times the size of stock market—source country and stock
market—destination country to analyze sensitivity of Asian countries to
the size of the stock market. Thus, they can use coeﬃcient dummies to ob-
tain more fruitful characterization of the Asian intraregional bond trans-
actions, which is related to Asian bond market issues.
The fourth comment is related to the analytical result of negative factors
on the Asian mutual funds’ investments into the Asian region. Given that
the Asia dummy refers to capital ﬂows from one Asian country to the other
Asian countries, the result does not always imply both that the Asian mu-
tual funds’ investments are signiﬁcantly smaller and that their investments
into the Asia are signiﬁcantly smaller. This is why Asian mutual funds are
signiﬁcantly smaller, because household’s savings tend to go into less risky
ﬁnancial instruments of banks and insurance companies. If this is true, the
ABF 2 might not improve the situation, contrary to what the authors sug-
gest. However, the ABF 2 is expected to stimulate investments into the
Asia, especially local-currency denominated Asian bonds.
Lastly, I suggest the authors investigate eﬀects on liquidity in bond mar-
kets on capital ﬂows. Ogawa and Shimizu (2004) and Shimizu and Ogawa
(2005) investigated advantages and disadvantages of choosing a common
regional currency basket unit over an international currency as a denomi-
nation currency for bond issuers and foreign investors in terms of both for-
eign exchange risks and liquidity in the case of Asian bond market. Al-
though the basket currency denominated bonds would contribute to
decreasing the foreign exchange risks, bond issuers and investors may pre-
fer the U.S. dollar denominated bonds to the currency basket denominated
bonds as long as they care about liquidity rather than foreign exchange
risks. The liquidity problem is key in fostering the regional bond market in
Asia.
References
Ito, T. 2003. Construction of infrastructures for the development of regional bonds
market. In Financial Development and Integration in East Asia, eds. C. Y. Ahn, T.
Ito, M. Kawai, and Y. C. Park, 206–21. Korea Institute for International Eco-
nomic Policy.
Ogawa, E., and J. Shimizu. 2004. Bonds issuers’ trade-oﬀ for common currency
basket denominated bonds in East Asia. Journal of Asian Economics 15:719–38.
Shimizu, J., and E. Ogawa. 2005. Risk properties of AMU denominated Asian
bonds. Journal of Asian Economics 16:590–611.
Bond Markets as Conduits for Capital Flows: How Does Asia Compare? 313